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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-21-3(2)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellees disagree with Appellants' statement of the first issue for review 
which inaccurately reflects the Utah mechanic's lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-
l-7(l)(a)(b). Further, the issue should be split into three issues. 
Issue No. 1 (part one): The first part of the issue properly stated is whether 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment nullifying Appellant's 
mechanic's lien when the district court determined that the lien was filed out of 
time based on Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) which requires a written notice of 
lien to be filed within 90 days from the date the person last supplied labor, 
equipment or material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102, where Appellant's Notice of Lien was filed 133 days 
after the Notice of Lien states that Appellant last supplied labor, equipment and 
material for the installation of a roadway and water, sewer and storm drains for a 
residential subdivision. 
Issue No. 1 (part two): The second part of the issue properly stated is 
whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment nullifying 
Appellant's mechanic's lien when the district court determined that the mechanic's 
lien was filed out of time based on Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b) which requires 
a written notice of lien to be filed within 90 days from the date of final completion 
of an original contract not involving a residence as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-11-102, where Appellant filed its Notice of Lien 947 days after completion of 
a 1997 Construction Agreement between Appellant and Husting Land & 
Development Company, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession. 
Issue No. 1 (part three): The third part of the issue properly stated is 
whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment nullifying 
Appellant's mechanic's lien when Appellant failed to file an action to enforce its 
lien as required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 which requires an action to be filed 
within 180 days from the date the person last supplied labor, equipment or material 
on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in Utah Code Ann. §38-11-
102, where the above entitled action was filed 291 days, and the answer and 
counterclaim was filed 315 days, after the Notice of Lien states that Appellant last 
supplied labor, equipment and material for the installation of a roadway and water, 
sewer and storm drains for a residential subdivision. 
Standard of Review: Because this is an appeal from the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in Appellees' favor, the Court of Appeals views the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
Appellants. Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, \ 11, 63 P.3d 721. Because the 
determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate presents a question of 
law, the Court of Appeals accords no deference to the district court's decision and 
instead reviews it for correctness. Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, f 8, 74 P. 
3d 628. The Court of Appeals reviews the district couifs legal conclusions, 
including those of pure statutory interpretation, for correctness, giving no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., 
Inc., 2000 UT 90, f 7, 15 P.3d 1030. 
Issue No. 2: Appellees also disagree with Appellants' Second Issue for 
Review which should properly be stated as follows: 
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing McKelPs 
quantum meruit claim where McKell failed to exhaust its legal remedies and 
where, based on record, McKell failed to establish that it was entitled to equitable 
relief? 
Standard of Review: Because this is an appeal from the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in Appellees' favor, the Court of Appeals views the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
Appellants. Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, f 11, 63 P.3d 721. Because the 
determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate presents a question of 
law, the Court of Appeals accords no deference to the district court's decision and 
instead reviews it for correctness. Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, f 8, 74 P. 
3d 628. The Court of Appeals reviews the district court's legal conclusions, 
including those of pure statutory interpretation, for correctness, giving no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., 
Inc., 2000 UT 90, % 7, 15 P.3d 1030. 
Appellants preserved the issues in the trial court in the opposition to 
Appellees1 motion for summary judgment. R. 256-317. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This lawsuit is about a mechanic's lien recorded by R.A. McKell 
Excavating, Inc. ("McKell"), on June 7, 2000 against residential property known as 
Parkway Estates, in Draper, Utah, that was previously owned by John Holmes 
Construction, Inc., Coulter & Smith, Ltd. (hereafter collectively "Holmes and 
Coulter") and its predecessor Mesa Development Company. McKell is a pipe 
contractor whose business is to install sewer lines, water lines and storm drains. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Holmes and Coulter filed their complaint against R.A. McKell Excavating, 
Inc. and its owner, Rick McKell, with three causes of action: (1) relief from 
McKell's mechanic's lien; (2) slander of title; and (3) tortious interference. McKell 
filed its answer with a counterclaim asserting a claim to foreclose its mechanic's 
lien and a claim for quantum meruit. 
Holmes and Coulter filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 
20, 2002 challenging both claims for relief in the counterclaim. McKell filed its 
opposing memorandum on June 5, 2002, and Holmes and Coulter filed their reply 
memorandum on June 21, 2002. The court heard oral argument on August 12, 
2002 and ruled from the bench. Holmes' and Coulter's counsel prepared the 
appropriate order. McKell objected and submitted its own order. Holmes and 
Coulter objected to McKell's proposed Order and the district court thereafter 
entered the proposed Order that Holmes' and Coulter's counsel had submitted. 
The district court entered the Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on October 9, 2002. McKell appeals this order. 
On April 25, 2003, Holmes and Coulter submitted a Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees. McKell filed its opposition on May 20, 2003, and Holmes and 
Coulter filed their reply on May 28, 2003. The court held oral argument on July 
14, 2003 and ruled from the bench. An Order Granting Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees was entered on August 5, 2003. McKell appeals this Order. 
While the motion for an award of attorney's fees was pending, the parties 
stipulated on July 14, 2003 to allow Holmes and Coulter to dismiss their slander of 
title and tortious interference claims. 
The court entered a Final Judgment on August 5, 2003. McKell appeals this 
Order. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
The 1997 and 1999 Construction Agreements 
1. Husting Land & Development, Inc. ("Husting"), was incorporated in 
1994 for the purpose of developing a sixty-one acre, three-phase, sixty-nine lot 
residential subdivision in Draper, Utah, commonly known as Galena Hills. 
Bankruptcy Court Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2, R. 147.x 
2. Initially, Galena Hills was landlocked. Complaint, *[f 10, R. 1; 
Answer, f 10, R. 28. 
3. Adjacent to Galena Hills was another subdivision development 
project, Parkway Estates, owned by Appellee John Holmes Construction, Inc. 
("Holmes") and Mesa Development, Inc. ("Mesa"), the predecessor to Appellee 
Coulter & Smith, Ltd. (hereafter collectively "Holmes and Coulter"). Because 
Galena Hills was landlocked and required access through Parkway Estates 
property, and Galena Hills and Parkway Estates shared common areas and 
roadways, it was necessary to install certain improvements and utilities that would 
1
 The Bankruptcy Court Memorandum Decision and Order is included in the Addendum 
at Tab "A". 
benefit both subdivisions. Bankruptcy Court Memorandum Decision and Order at 
p. 3, R. 147. 
4. Thus, Husting and Holmes and Mesa entered into an Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement (R. 121) in which Holmes and Mesa agreed to deed a 
strip of property for a dedicated road to Draper City (the "Roadway" or "Galena 
Park Boulevard") that would unlock access to Galena Hills, and in exchange 
Husting agreed to complete certain improvements on Parkway Estates. Holmes 
and Mesa agreed to reimburse Husting on a pro rata basis for its construction 
expenses. The Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement provided that reimbursement 
funds would not be paid to Husting until twenty-four months after final inspection 
and approval of construction by various municipalities, and then only if certain 
other conditions were met. Id. 
5. In connection with the development of Galena Hills, Husting was 
required by Draper City and the Salt Lake County Sewer Improvement District to 
post cash escrow bonds (the Escrow Accounts) in the aggregate amount of 
approximately $612,000 to ensure payment to all persons supply labor, services, 
equipment, or material to the Galena Hills project. Id. at p. 2-3. 
6. In February 1996, Husting entered into a Development Agreement 
with Construct Tech, in which Construct Tech agreed to provide excavation and 
construction services for the Galena Hills project, including storm drains, sewer, 
curb and gutter, sidewalk and street improvements. Id. 
7. From its inception, the relationship between Husting and Construct 
Tech was fraught with problems and disagreements. Construct Tech's work was 
incomplete, substandard and defective. Ultimately, in November of 1996, Husting 
terminated its contract with Construct Tech. Id. at p. 4. 
8. As a result of difficulties encountered with Construct Tech, the 
Galena Hills project was seriously behind schedule and Husting was unable to 
meet payment obligations on its construction financing. On January 14, 1997, 
Husting, as debtor-in-possession, filed its voluntary petition for relief under 
Chapter 11. At the time of its Chapter 11 filing, Husting's intention for 
reorganization was to complete necessary subdivision improvements to Galena 
Hills and then sell the improved lots to pay secured and unsecured creditors. Id. 
9. In February, 1997, Husting's sole shareholder and president, Leon 
Harward, and Rick McKell, President of R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. ("McKell") 
visited the Galena Hills site to assess the work necessary to correct defects in the 
excavation and construction work and complete the project. Harward invited 
McKell to bid on the project. Id. 
10. In April 1997, Husting and McKell entered into a post-petition 
agreement (1997 Construction Agreement)2, whereby McKell agreed to correct the 
defective work performed pre-petition by Construct Tech and to complete the 
remaining work on Phase II of the Galena Hills and Parkway Estates projects on a 
time and materials basis. Id. 
11. Prior to entering into the 1997 Construction Agreement, McKell was 
aware that Husting had filed for relief under Chapter 11 and understood that the 
only present sources of payment for its work was the approximate $612,000 in the 
Escrow Accounts established pursuant to the bonds with Draper City and the Salt 
Lake County Sewer District. However, Harward also led McKell to believe that 
other sources of payment existed, including the Adjoining Subdivisions 
Agreement, and funds from Castle Homes, L.L.C., a third-party investor that 
purportedly intended to purchase and build homes on the lots once the 
underground and surface improvements had been completed by McKell, and to 
otherwise invest in Husting in some fashion. Id. at pp. 5-6; Affidavit of R.A. 
McKell If 6, R. 128. 
12. Husting did not obtain bankruptcy court approval for incurring post-
petition unsecured debt under the terms of the 1997 Construction Agreement. 
Bankruptcy Court Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 6, R. 147. 
The 1997 Construction Agreement between Husting and McKell is included in the 
addendum at Tab "B". 
13. Husting was not the agent for Holmes and Coulter; rather Husting 
acted for itself in the performance of its obligations under the Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement. David George Affidavit fflf 4-6, R. 248; Nathan Coulter 
Affidavit ^ 5-7, R.252.3 
14. Holmes and Mesa were not parties to the 1997 Construction 
Agreement and McKell agreed to look solely to Husting and the escrowed funds 
for payment. R. 121. 
15. Although the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement required Holmes' 
and Mesa's prior approval of any contractor Husting hired, as well as their 
authorization of any work performed by the contractor, Holmes and Mesa never 
approved McKell as the contractor, nor did they ever authorize McKell's work. 
David George Aff. If 4-6, R. 248; Nathan Coulter Aff. fflf 5-7, R. 252. 
16. Neither Holmes, Mesa, nor Coulter, ever requested any construction 
services from McKell, nor did they ever offer or agree to pay McKell. David 
George Aff. f 8, R. 248; Nathan Coulter Aff. f 9 , R. 252. 
17. Rick McKell asserted that he only met Nathan Coulter twice. Mr. 
Coulter is the president of Mesa Development and Coulter & Smith. The first 
meeting supposedly occurred when McKell was installing the sewer and water 
laterals within the scope of the 1997 Construction Agreement. Rick McKell 
The two affidavits - David George and Nathan Coulter - are included in the Addendum 
at Tab "C". 
merely asked Mr. Coulter to identify the location of the laterals in the vicinity of 
Parkway Estates. Second Affidavit of Rick McKell, f 3, R. 313.4 The second 
meeting apparently involved a conversation wherein Mr. Coulter asked McKell to 
provide a bid to complete a cul-de-sac off Galena Park Boulevard and to complete 
a subsequent phase of Parkway Estates. The bid, for work which was outside the 
scope of the 1997 Construction Agreement, was apparently never furnished to Mr. 
Coulter and the additional work was never performed. Id. 
18. McKell also said that in October 1997, long after McKell had entered 
into the 1997 Construction Agreement, that an unidentified speaker corroborated 
statements made by Husting's president, Leon Harward, that Castle Homes was 
going to buy Husting's stock and would pay McKell's outstanding invoices. 
Affidavit of R.A. McKell f 16, R. 128. 
19. McKell provided labor and materials under the 1997 Construction 
Agreement from June 30, 1997 to November 1997. On November 4, 1997 McKell 
walked off the job, or as Rick McKell put it in his affidavit, "ceased work on the 
project". McKell's final invoice to Husting was dated December 15, 1997. Id., f 
17. 
4
 Affidavit of R.A. McKell (without exhibits) and Second Affidavit of R.A. McKell are 
included in the Addendum at Tab "D". 
20. McKell always directed its invoices to Husting and never made a 
single demand for payment to Holmes and Mesa. David George Aff. f 9, R. 248; 
Nathan Coulter Aff. f 10, R. 252. 
21. On April 1998, three months after a trustee had been appointed in 
Husting's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, McKell filed a Motion for Allowance of 
Administrative Expense in Husting's bankruptcy seeking payment for its work 
under the 1997 Construction Agreement. See, Bankruptcy Court Memorandum 
Decision and Order, R. 147. 
22. Judge Boulden denied McKell's motion on November 22, 2000 on the 
basis that Husting's 1997 Construction Agreement with McKell was not in the 
ordinary course of Husting's business and that Husting should have obtained post 
petition approval before entering into the agreement. Id. 
23. In September 1999, the trustee obtained a bankruptcy court order that 
authorized the trustee to enter into contracts for construction and development of 
the debtor's property, Galena Hills. The Order Approving Post-Petition Financing 
With Eagle Pointe Financial Group and Eagle Pointe Realty And Management, 
Inc., authorized the trustee to borrow money from Eagle Pointe Financial to 
complete the "Project", which was a defined term in the order meaning "the 
organized undertaking to develop the Debtor's (i.e., Husting's) Real Property." 
Eagle Point Financial's loan to the trustee was secured by the debtor's property 
(i.e., Galena Hills) and Eagle Point Financial was to be repaid as the Galena Hills 
lots were sold. Parkway Estates was not part of the "Project" the trustee was 
authorized to complete. Order Approving Post-Petition Financing With Eagle 
Pointe Financial Group and Eagle Pointe Realty And Management, Inc., R. 169. 
24. In September 1999, as soon as the bankruptcy court order was signed, 
the trustee retained Eagle Pointe Realty and Management, Inc. ("Eagle Pointe") to 
develop Galena Hills. Eagle Pointe in turn entered into a new Construction 
Agreement with McKell, effective September 20, 1999 (the "1999 Construction 
Agreement"). R. 177. 
25. McKell performed no construction work of any kind on either 
Parkway Estates, or Galena Hills, during the 22 month period from November 
1997 to September 1999. David George Aff. 1f 7, R. 248; Nathan Coulter Aff. 18, 
R. 252. 
26. McKell's work performed for Eagle Pointe under the 1999 
Construction Agreement was to complete the "Project", meaning "the organized 
undertaking to develop the Debtor's (i.e., Husting's) real property." Order 
Approving Post-Petition Financing With Eagle Pointe Financial Group and Eagle 
Pointe Realty And Management, Inc., p. 2, R. 169. 
27. In April 2000, the trustee's construction manager, Brian Lloyd, filed 
an affidavit in Husting's bankruptcy to facilitate payment to McKell for its work 
under the 1999 Construction Agreement. Lloyd confirmed that in September 1999, 
on behalf of the trustee, Lloyd had hired McKell to install the permanent roadway 
leading to Galena Hills. Lloyd further confirmed that McKell's water and sewer 
installations beneath Galena Park Boulevard were done prior to September 1999. 
In other words, any sewer and water work that McKell did along Galena Park 
Boulevard that would have benefited Parkway Estates was all done no later than 
November 1997 under the 1997 Construction Agreement. Brian Lloyd Affidavit, 
R. 197. 
Husting's Breach of the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement 
28. On July 21, 1999, before McKell resumed any work and before the 
bankruptcy court approved any loans to the trustee from Eagle Point Financial, 
Holmes and Mesa filed a Motion for Relief from Stay in the Husting bankruptcy. 
The motion for relief from stay stated Holmes' and Mesa's position that Husting 
had failed to complete its performance and was in material breach of the Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement. Copies of the motion for relief were served upon McKell 
and McKelPs attorney, so that McKell was fully aware that Holmes and Mesa did 
not want McKell to do any more work on Parkway Estates. R. 195. 
29. On October 22, 1999 Holmes and Mesa mailed to McKell and 
McKell's attorney a second Motion for Relief from Stay which reiterated Holmes' 
and Mesa's position that a material breach of the Adjoining Subdivisions 
Agreement by Husting had terminated the agreement. The motion papers also 
informed McKell that Holmes and Mesa had expressly requested that the trustee 
not perform any work on Parkway Estates in connection with the trustee's efforts 
to construct the access road and infrastructure improvements along Galena Park 
Boulevard leading to Galena Hills. R. 225. 
McKell's Claim of Notice of Lien 
30. On or about June 7, 2000, McKell recorded a Notice of Claim of Lien 
("Notice of Lien")5 against Parkway Estates in the amount of $132,824.18 together 
with interest, costs and attorney fees. Notice of Lien, R. 193. 
31. McKell's Notice of Lien claims a lien against Parkway Estates for 
work that McKell performed at the request of Husting Land & Development, Inc. 
(not the Trustee and not Eagle Pointe). Id. 
32. Although the Notice of Lien inaccurately asserts that McKell's last 
work was supposedly performed on January 26, 2000, McKell's counsel admitted 
at the summary judgment hearing that McKell's mechanic's lien relates solely to 
work McKell performed on Parkway Estates before McKell walked off the job on 
5
 The Notice of Lien is included in the Addendum at Tab "E". 
November 4, 1997. In other words, McKell's lien relates solely to work McKell 
performed under the 1997 Construction Agreement. Hearing Transcript, 8/12/02, 
at 11: 9-18, R. 452. 
Sale of Parkway Estates 
33. On or about August 1, 2000, Holmes and Coulter sold Parkway 
Estates to Draper City as undeveloped land. David George Aff. f 10, R. 248. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is undisputed that McKell's work was residential, not commercial or 
industrial, and, although McKelPs Notice of Lien states that McKell's labor and 
materials were last provided on January 26, 2000, Rick McKell was adamant when 
he was trying to get paid from Husting's bankruptcy estate in 1999 that McKell 
ceased work on the project on November 4, 1997. Ultimately, McKell's counsel 
admitted at the summary judgment hearing before Judge Bohling that all of the 
work for which McKell claimed a lien against Parkway Estates was completed no 
later than November 1997. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) requires a written notice of lien to be filed 
within 90 days from the date the person last supplied labor, equipment or material 
on a project or improvement for a "residence" as defined in Utah Code Ann. §38-
11-102. Even if McKell is given the benefit of the erroneous last date of work in 
its Notice of Lien, McKell's lien was recorded on the 133rd day, 43 days too late. 
If McKell's lien is not invalid because McKell failed to record its lien within 
90 days of the date of its last work under section 38-l-7(l)(a), its lien is invalid 
under section 38-l-7(l)(b) because McKell failed to record its lien within 90 days 
of final completion of the original contract, which is the 1997 Construction 
Agreement between McKell and Husting, that was "finally completed" in 
November 1997 when McKell ceased work on the project. 
McKell also failed to file an action to enforce its lien within 180 days from 
the date it last supplied labor and material on a project or improvement for a 
residence as defined in section 38-11-102, as required by section 38-1-11. 
Next, the record does not support a claim for quantum meruit under either 
branch of the equitable doctrine. McKell performed its work under the 1997 
Construction Agreement with Husting. Even though McKell may not have been 
paid, McKell has no equitable claim against Holmes and Coulter. McKell failed to 
exhaust its legal remedies and, even if McKell's work benefited Parkway Estates, 
Holmes and Coulter never made use of the benefit. Importantly, Holmes and 
Coulter never requested McKell's construction services and neither company ever 
agreed to pay McKell for its work. 
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's 
fees under the mechanic's lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. The record was 
well documented and the district court made appropriate findings in making its 
award of fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
MCKELL'S NOTICE OF LIEN WAS NOT TIMELY UNDER EITHER 
SUBPART OF THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE 
McKelPs mechanic's lien is invalid as a matter of law because McKell did 
not record its Notice of Lien, or sue to enforce its lien, within the time required by 
Utah law. The Utah statute governing mechanic's liens limits the time in which a 
person may record a mechanic's lien to no later than 90 days from either the date 
of last work performed in the case of a project or improvement for a residence, or 
90 days from final completion of an original contract in a case not involving a 
residence. The relevant statute reads: 
A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for 
record with the county recorder of the county in which the 
property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written 
notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last 
furnished equipment or material on a project or 
improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-
102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not 
involving a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a), (b) (2000). 
Whether the time for recording McKell's lien is measured under subpart (a) 
for a project or improvement for a "residence", or under subpart (b) for final 
completion of an original contract not involving a residence, McKell's lien was 
untimely. 
A. This Was A Project or Improvement For A Residence 
Because the labor, equipment and material that McKell provided was on a 
project or improvement for a residence as defined in section 38-11-102, the lien 
had to be recorded within 90 days from the last date of work. Even if McKell is 
given the benefit of the inaccurate statement in its Notice of Lien that its last work 
was performed on January 26, 2000, the lien had to be recorded by April 26, 2000. 
Instead, McKell recorded its lien on June 7, 2000. It was clearly out of time. 
McKell argues that when section 38-1-7 is "read in conjunction with the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act", Utah Code Ann. § 38-
11-101, e* seq., it is apparent that subpart (l)(a) of section 38-1-7 is inapplicable to 
McKell's lien. Frankly, McKell's argument is difficult to understand and a close 
reading of Senate Bill 87 (included in McKell's Addendum) reveals that McKell's 
argument has no support. 
When the Utah legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 87 titled "Mechanics' 
Lien and Bonding Amendments" during the 1994 legislative session, it made 
amendments to the mechanic's lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 et seq.. 
Specifically, section 38-1-7(1) was amended as follows: 
Recording - Service on owner of property. 
(1) [Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit 
of] A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall 
within [&Q] 90 days [after substantial completion of the 
project or improvement shall] from the date the person last 
performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or 
material on a project or improvement file for record with the 
county recorder of the county in which the property, or some 
part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and 
claim a lien. 
In the same Senate Bill No. 87, the legislature enacted Chapter 11 of Title 38 
naming it the "Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act" (the 
"Act"). The purpose of the Act we are told, is to protect homeowners who build 
"owner-occupied residences" from subcontractors' mechanic's liens when the 
homeowner has already paid his general contractor. The Act contains separate 
definitions for a "residence"6 and an "owner-occupied residence"7 and it is owner-
occupied residences that are protected by the Act. When Senate Bill 87 was passed 
6
 "Residence" means an improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used or 
occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary detached single-family 
dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units. Utah Code Ann. §38-11-
102(18)(2000). 
7
 "Owner-occupied residence" means a residence that is, or after completion of the 
construction on the residence will be, occupied by the owner or the owner's tenant or 
lessee as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days from the date of the 
completion of the construction on the residence. Utah Code Ann. §38-11-
102(14)(2000). 
there was no distinction made between, and no amendment to section 38-1-7 to 
account for, liens recorded against residential, owner-occupied residential and non-
residential property. All mechanic's liens were given the same treatment and each 
had to be recorded within 90 days from the last date of work. While McKell places 
great emphasis in its brief on the legislative debate surrounding the 1994 
enactment of the Act and its purposes, there was clearly no intention when the Act 
was passed to tie the time limits for recording mechanic's liens in section 38-1-7 
with any purposes of the Act. 
In 1995 the legislature again amended section 38-1-7, this time forming 
subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b), making a distinction between the filing periods for 
residential and non-residential liens. 1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115)(included 
in McKell's Addendum). In new section 38-l-7(l)(a), the legislature borrowed the 
definition of "residence" from the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act that had passed the year before. If the legislature had intended to relate 
section 38-l-7(l)(a) to the purposes of the Act as McKell suggests, the legislature 
could just as easily have distinguished the two filing periods in subparts (l)(a) and 
(l)(b) according to whether the lien related to a project or improvement for an 
owner-occupied residence as defined in the Act, and the final completion of a 
contract not involving an owner-occupied residence as defined in the Act. The 
legislature chose not to do this and section 38-l-7(l)(a) means what it 
unambiguously says: If the lien is for a project or improvement for a "residence" 
as defined in section 38-11-102, the lien must be recorded within 90 days from the 
last date of work. 
The issue before the district court, and now before this court, is whether 
McKell's work to install the infrastructure improvements for a residential 
subdivision is a "project or improvement for a residence." We believe the 
question is answered by First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel, 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), where the Court decided that the installation of the sewer 
and water system in a residential subdivision is lienable work because it improves 
the actual homes by making them habitable. The similar work McKell claimed for 
its lien was certainly a project or improvement for a residence. 
B. The 1999 Construction Agreement With Eagle Pointe To Develop Only 
Galena Hills Is Not The Original Contract That Is The Basis For 
McKell's Lien 
If McKell's lien is not invalid because McKell failed to record its lien within 
90 days of its date of last work under section 38-l-7(l)(a), its lien is invalid 
because McKell failed to record its lien within 90 days of final completion of an 
original contract under section 38-l-7(l)(b). 
The 1997 Construction Agreement was the "original contract" that was 
finally completed on November 4? 1997, when McKell uceased work on the 
project". 
According to McKell's admission at the summary judgment hearing, all of 
the work McKell liened was performed in 1997, obviously under the 1997 
Construction Agreement. The separate 1999 Construction Agreement cannot make 
timely the June 2000 filing of the Notice of Lien for the work McKell performed in 
1997. 
For 22 months, from November 1997 until September 1999, no work 
occurred at Galena Hills. Husting's bankruptcy trustee was eventually authorized 
in September 1999 to borrow money from Eagle Pointe Financial to complete the 
"Project", which was a defined term in the bankruptcy court's order meaning "the 
organized undertaking to develop the Debtor's (i.e., Husting's) real property." 
Eagle Point Financial's loan was secured by Husting's real property and the loan 
was to be repaid as the Galena Hills lots were sold. Having secured the means to 
pay for the work, the trustee's agent then hired McKell to complete Galena Hills 
under the terms of the 1999 Construction Agreement. There was no mechanism in 
the bankruptcy court's authorization to recoup any expenses for any work on 
Parkway Estates and having previously experienced the power of the bankruptcy 
court to deny payment for work that was not authorized, McKell was hardly going 
to do any more work on Parkway Estates. McKell proceeded to put in the 
permanent roadway along Galena Park Boulevard to provide access to Galena Hills 
without installing a single curb cut leading to Parkway Estates. The fact that 
McKell was paid with court approved financing for all of its work under its 1999 
Construction Agreement with Eagle Point is a clear admission that McKell stuck to 
developing Galena Hills and nothing more. 
To be valid, McKelPs lien had to be filed no later than 90 days after 
"completion of an original contract". Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b). 
Termination or a lengthy suspension of work under a contract is "completion" of 
the contract for purposes of determining the commencement of a time period under 
a mechanic's lien statute. 
In Roberts v. Hansen, 25 Utah 2d 190, 279 P.2d 345 (1971), a property 
owner hired a contractor to build a home. The owner dismissed the contractor after 
a dispute arose. The dismissed contractor filed a mechanic's lien against the 
property. The issue before the court was what constituted "completion of an 
original contract" from which the period for commencing an action to enforce a 
mechanic's lien begins to run. The Utah Supreme Court held that the "completion 
of an original contract" that triggered the filing period occurred on the date the 
contractor was dismissed. 479 P.2d at 346-347. See also Govert Copier Painting 
v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (12 month period of § 
38-1-11 for commencing action to enforce lien after completion of original 
contract ran from date contractor stopped work where contractor left work for 
others to complete). 
Applying the rationale of Roberts, the completion of an original contract for 
the 1997 Construction Agreement occurred when McKell ceased work on the 
project on November 4, 1997, and any mechanic's lien had to be recorded within 
90 days thereafter. 
Furthermore, the section of the mechanic's lien statute that provides for the 
priority of a lien to relate back to earlier work on the same improvement (Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-5) only applies when the work has been performed "without 
material abandonment." Colder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 
1982). There must be "a continuity of purpose such that a reasonable observer of 
the site would be on notice that work was underway for which a lien could be 
claimed." Nu-trend Electric, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "The question is 
primarily one of notice . . . ." Id. David George and Nathan Coulter both swore 
that there was no observable work during the 22 month period and their statements 
were uncontroverted. George Aff. f 7 , R. 248; Coulter Aff. f 8, R. 252. 
McKell's Notice of Lien admits that the 1999 Construction Agreement has 
no bearing on McKell's lien claim. The notice states that McKell was "employed 
by and did provide contracting services . . . at the request of Husting Land and 
Development, Inc.". Any opportunity Husting ever had to request McKell's 
services occurred before the Chapter 11 trustee was appointed and well before the 
court authorized the 1999 Construction Agreement with Eagle Pointe. 
C. McKell Never Filed An Action To Enforce Its Lien Within 180 Days 
Even though McKelFs failure to timely record its lien pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-7(1) is enough to doom the lien, McKell also failed to file an action to 
enforce its lien within the time limit set by the statute. According to Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-11(b), McKell had 180 days to sue after its last work was performed. 
The statute reads: 
A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed 
under this chapter within: 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last 
performed labor and services or last furnished equipment or 
material for a residence, as defined in section 38-11-102. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(b). 
McKelPs Notice of Lien inaccurately states that McKelPs services, labor or 
materials were last provided on January 26, 2000. We know from the admission of 
McKelfs counsel that the last date of work was actually in November 1997, but 
even if McKell is given the benefit of last date of work in the Notice of Lien, 
McKell still failed to sue in time. Based on the statement in the Notice of Lien, 
McKell should have filed its action to enforce its lien within 180 days of January 
26, 2000, or in other words by July 25, 2000. The complaint was filed on 
November 13, 2000, and McKell filed its answer and counterclaim on December 7, 
2000. Clearly, McKell failed to comply with the statute and it has lost the right to 
enforce its lien. See, Roberts v. Hansen, supra; Govert Copier Painting, supra. 
II 
MCKELL DID NOT ESTABLISH A QUANTUM MERUIT CLAIM 
Although the district court dismissed McKell's quantum meruit claim on the 
grounds that McKell was not entitled to equitable relief against Holmes and 
Coulter because McKell had an express contract with Husting, see e.g., Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(holding that recovery under quantum 
meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists), "[a] party to 
an appeal does not have a constitutional right to have a cause of action decided on 
a particular ground." Bailey, supra (citing DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995)). This Court can affirm the district court's ruling granting summary 
judgment if "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court 
to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or 
theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." Bailey v. Bayles, 
2002 UT 58, t 10, 52 P.3d 1158; Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, U 18, 29 P.3d 
1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 
n.2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969); see also Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 
(Utah 1998) (applying Limb); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 714 (1993) ("Generally, 
the appellate court may affirm the judgment where it is correct on any legal ground 
or theory disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason, or theory 
adopted by the trial court"). 
A. McKell Failed To Exhaust His Legal Remedies. This Barred Any Claim 
For Quantum Meruit. 
Before McKell was entitled to pursue a quantum meruit claim, McKell was 
required to first exhaust its legal remedies. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). McKell's legal remedies included filing a mechanics lien. 
Id. However, McKell failed to perfect its mechanic's lien because it recorded the 
lien too late, and it failed to file an action to enforce the lien within the time 
allowed by law. This was a failure to exhaust McKelPs legal remedies and it 
barred McKell from pursuing a quantum meruit claim. Id. This was precisely 
what occurred in Knight v. Post and it was dispositive of the quantum meruit 
claim. 
B, Although A Failure To Exhaust Legal Remedies Is Dispositive, McKell 
Also Never Demonstrated The Necessary Elements For A Quantum 
Meruit Claim, 
Although McKelPs failure to exhaust its legal remedies is dispositive of its 
quantum meruit claim, McKell never met the requirements for a quantum meruit 
claim under Utah law and granting summary judgment was proper on that basis. 
Utah courts recognize two branches of quantum meruit: "(1) contracts 
implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, which are not 
actions to enforce a contract but are actually actions to require restitution; and (2) 
contracts implied in fact, which are contracts established by conduct." Knight v. 
Posf,748P.2datll00. 
1. McKell Did Not Establish the Elements of Unjust Enrichment 
Both branches of quantum meruit are rooted in "justice". Davies, 746 P.2d 
at 269. McKell found itself in the predicament of being owed for its work because 
it knowingly entered into a construction contract with a Chapter 11 debtor without 
seeking prior bankruptcy court approval. McKell never sent Holmes and Coulter a 
bill and there is no record that Holmes, Mesa or Coulter ever requested services 
from McKell or misled McKell. 
A party seeking to recover under the quasi-contract or unjust enrichment 
branch of quantum meruit must establish three elements: (1) the defendant received 
a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) 
under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without paying for it." Id.; see also, Davies v. Olson, supra, 746 P.2d at 
269. 
Even if Holmes and Coulter received a benefit from McKell and used that 
benefit (although we point out below that this did not happen), McKell was 
required to show that it was inequitable under the circumstances for Holmes and 
Coulter to retain the benefit. Knight, 748 P.2d at 1101. In Commercial Fixtures 
and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme 
Court defined inequitable circumstances as: 
"[t]he mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract 
between two others does not make such third person liable 
in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. There 
must be some misleading act, request for services, or the 
like, to support such an action. Mere failure of performance 
by one of the contracting parties does not give rise to a right 
of restitution." 
564 P.2d at 774. 
Holmes and Coulter never mislead McKell or requested its services. In fact, 
Rick McKell claimed to have spoken with Nathan Coulter only twice. The first 
instance was when McKell was already working for Husting and Mr. Coulter 
simply pointed out the locations for the sewer laterals in the vicinity of Parkway 
Estates. Id. The second instance apparently involved a conversation wherein Mr. 
Coulter asked McKell to provide a bid to complete a subsequent phase of Parkway 
Estates. The bid, for work which was outside the scope of McKell's 1997 
Construction Agreement with Husting, was apparently never furnished to Mr. 
Coulter and the additional work was never performed. 
McKell also said that in October 1997, long after McKell had contracted 
with Husting, and just before McKell walked off the job, an unidentified speaker 
supposedly corroborated statements made by Husting's president, Leon Harward, 
that Castle Homes was going to buy Husting's stock and would pay McKell's 
outstanding invoices. While McKell must have been disappointed when Castle 
Homes failed to materialize, McKell never stated that Holmes, Mesa and Coulter 
ever requested McKell's services, or that Holmes, Mesa and Coulter ever said that 
they would pay McKell's bills. In fact, the affidavits of David George and Nathan 
Coulter expressly deny that Holmes, Mesa and Coulter ever asked McKell to do 
any work or that McKell ever looked to any of these companies for payment. 
In short, McKell never demonstrated that it would be inequitable for Holmes 
and Coulter to retain the benefit of McKell's work without payment of its value. 
See, Knight, 748 P.2d at 1101. 
The benefit of an unjust enrichment or restitution claim is determined from 
the perspective of the party that supposedly benefited from the work, not the 
benefactor. See e.g., Davies v. Olsen, supra, 746 P.2d at 269. Although Judge 
Boulden found that McKell conferred a benefit on Parkway Estates, Holmes and 
Coulter never used the benefit. When Holmes and Mesa entered into the 
Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement they expected Husting to immediately install 
the Roadway and underlying improvements so that Holmes and Mesa could 
develop Parkway Estates. When Husting failed in its required performance, 
Holmes and Mesa (and later Coulter) abandoned their plans and sold Parkway 
Estates to Draper City in 2000 as undeveloped property. The uncontroverted 
affidavits of David George and Nathan Coulter attest that Holmes and Coulter 
never used the benefit of McKell's work. 
McKell's claim under the unjust enrichment doctrine of quantum meruit 
failed. 
2. McKell Did Not Establish the Elements of a Contract Implied in Fact 
McKell also never established a claim against Holmes and Coulter under the 
second branch of quantum meruit, contracts implied in fact. To prevail on an 
implied contract, McKell had to establish that: (1) Holmes and Coulter requested 
McKell to perform the work; (2) McKell expected Holmes and Coulter to 
compensate it; and (3) Holmes and Coulter knew or should have known that 
McKell expected compensation. Knight, v. Post, 748 P.2d at 1101, citing Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d at 269. The undisputed facts are contrary to each of these three 
required elements. 
There were only two parties to the 1997 Construction Agreement - McKell 
and Husting. There was no record that Holmes, Mesa or Coulter ever requested 
McKell to perform the work on Parkway Estates. In fact, McKell was resolute in 
the affidavit he filed with the bankruptcy court (R. 128) that he met with Husting's 
president and was hired by Husting. McKell never looked to anyone but Husting 
to pay for the work. From the time McKell began work in 1997 until its lien was 
recorded in June 2000, McKell never sent Holmes, Mesa or Coulter a single bill. 
Husting had agreed with Holmes and Mesa that in exchange for the 
dedication of the Roadway which unlocked the access to Husting's Galena Hills 
property, that Husting would be responsible for putting in the permanent road and 
underlying improvements. Husting, acting solely on its own behalf, attempted to 
perform its obligation by separately contracting with McKell. Husting hired 
McKell on a time and materials basis without any input from Holmes, Mesa or 
Coulter, which the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement required. There were no 
statements in the record that Holmes, Mesa or Coulter ever told McKell that they 
would be responsible for payment. Husting was obligated under the Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement to install the permanent roadway and improvements and 
Holmes and Mesa had no obligation to reimburse Husting for at least 24 months. 
Husting contracted with McKell, and Holmes, Mesa and Coulter simply had no 
reason to suppose that McKell was looking to them for payment. 
McKell did not satisfy any of the necessary elements for a claim under the 
contracts implied in fact branch of quantum meruit. Accordingly, summary 
judgment was appropriately granted dismissing the quantum meruit claim in 
McKelPs counterclaim. 
Ill 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
The district court awarded attorney's fees to Holmes and Coulter as the 
successful parties in this action to enforce a mechanic's lien under Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-1 et seq.. Accordingly attorneys' fees were awarded pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann § 38-1-18 on the basis of a very well documented attorneys' fees 
affidavit (R. 372) and following an opportunity for hearing where counsel 
represented the following: 
1. No attorneys' fees were sought for any time related to Holmes' and 
Coulter's claims for slander of title and tortious interference. In order to assure 
that only fees related to the mechanic's lien were included, none of the attorney's 
time spent drafting the complaint was included in the application for an award of 
attorney's fees, even though the complaint plainly related to the mechanic's lien. 
Hearing Transcript, 7/14/02, pp. 7-8, R. 453; 
2. Only the time spent on matters pertaining to McKell's mechanic's 
lien, including discovery, initial disclosures and motions, was included in the 
application for an award of fees. Id. at pp. 8-9; 
3. The preparation of the motion for partial summary judgment involved 
a lengthy fact statement and arguments that could have been obviated had McKell 
made the concession that was eventually made at the summary judgment hearing 
that the work McKell liened was all performed in 1997. Id. at pp. 8-12.; 
4. Research time was not reflected separately in the application, but 
extensive research was included within the attorney's time spent drafting the 
partial summary judgment motion and supporting papers. Counsel was prepared at 
the hearing to address no fewer than 22 relevant cases. Id. at p. 10; 
5. Additional attorney's time was spent objecting to McKell's proposed 
order that was not adopted by the district court. Id. 
The district court considered the respective motion papers in favor of and 
opposing an award of attorneys' fees, including the Joint Affidavit of P. Bruce 
Badger and Douglas J. Payne In Support Of Motion For Award Of Attorneys' 
Fees, and heard argument of counsel. The district court further reviewed the 
record in this case including plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
related papers which, according to the district court, presented complex issues 
relating to McKell's mechanic's lien. The district court further found that Holmes' 
and Coulter's counsel were experienced lawyers and that their hourly rates were 
justified based on their years in practice, their reputations, and the customary rates 
in the community, but that there was some duplication of effort and inefficiency. 
See, Order Granting Motion For Award of Attorneys Fees, R. 426. Based on these 
findings and the amount at issue and the result obtained, the court found that 
$25,000 (not $30,447.00 sought by Holmes and Coulter) was a reasonable 
attorney's fee. Id. 
The district court was fully apprised. There was no abuse of discretion and 
the award should stand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, all orders entered by the district court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 28th day of April 2004. 
P. Bruce Badger 
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CENTRAL DIVISION 
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HUSTING LAND & DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
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97-20309 JAB 
Chapter 11 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Steven F. Allred of Steven F. Allred, P.C, Oram, Utah, and Duane H, Gillman of McDowell & 
Gillman, P.C, Salt Lake City, Utah, for R. A. McKell Excavating, Inc., Applicant. 
R. Kimball Mosier of Parsons Davies Kinghorn & Peters, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Wayne F. 
Elggren, Chapter 11 Trustee. 
Adam S. Affleck of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the Webb 
Family Trust. 
Daniel E. Garrison and Michael R. Johnson of Snell & Wilmer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
Construct Tech, Inc. 
This is a contested matter arising from the application for allowance of administrative 
expense filed by R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. (RAM) in the Chapter 11 case of Husting Land & 
Development, Inc. (Husting). The issue presented is whether or not the administrative expense 
claim of RAM is allowable as a post-petition debt incurred in the ordinary course of business 
\Mn 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364(a).1 During a two-day evidentiary hearing, RAM presented evidence 
in support of its argument that the debt owed to it for infrastructure improvements made to 
Husting's real estate development was incurred in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, 
RAM offered, and the Court excluded, certain expert testimony on the basis that the failure to 
prove the reliability of the expert's methodology precluded the Court from considering his 
opinion as to whether the debt was incurred in the ordinary course of business. Upon careful 
consideration of the remaining evidence, the pleadings and arguments, and upon an independent 
analysis of applicable law, the Court concludes that, applying the creditor expectations/vertical 
dimension test, the debt incurred by Husting was not in the ordinary course of its business and, 
accordingly, RAM's claim cannot be allowed as an administrative expense of the estate under 
§ 503(b)(1). 
FACTS 
Husting was incorporated in 1994 for the purpose of developing a sixty-one acre, three-
phase, sixty-nine lot residential subdivision in Draper, Utah, commonly known as Galena Hills. 
The purchase price of the real estate, which was in excess of $1,075,000, was subordinated by 
the seller to a $1,500,000 development loan. In connection with the development of the Galena 
Hills project, Husting was required by Draper City and the Salt Lake County Sewer 
Improvement District to post cash escrow bonds (the Escrow Accounts) in the aggregate amount 
of approximately $612,000 to ensure payment to all persons supplying labor, services, 
1
 All future references are to Title 11 of the United States Code unless otherwise noted. 
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equipment, or material to the Galena Hills project. Husting could obtain incremental release of 
funds in the Escrow Accounts to pay for improvements once the municipalities had approved the 
installation of various phases of the infrastructure. 
Adjacent to Galena Hills was another subdivision development project, Parkway Estates, 
owned by John Holmes Construction, Inc. and Holmes Mesa Construction, Inc. (Holmes Mesa). 
Because Galena Hills required access through the Parkway Estates property, and Galena Hills 
and Parkway Estates shared common areas and roadways, it was necessary to install certain 
improvements and utilities that would benefit both subdivisions. Thus, Husting and Holmes 
Mesa entered into an Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement in which Husting agreed to complete 
certain improvements on Parkway Estates, and Holmes Mesa agreed to reimburse Husting on a 
pro rata basis for its construction expenses. The Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement provided 
that reimbursement funds would not be paid to Husting until twenty-four months after final 
inspection and approval of construction by various municipalities, and then only if certain other 
conditions were met. 
In February 1996, Husting entered into a Development Agreement with Construct Tech, 
in which Construct Tech agreed to provide excavation and construction services for the Galena 
Hills project, including storm drains, sewer, curb and gutter, sidewalk and street improvements. 
Construction on Galena Hills and the adjoining Parkway Estates subdivision was to begin in 
April of 1996. However, Construct Tech did not actually break ground on the project until June 
of that year. From its inception, the relationship between Husting and Construct Tech was 
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fraught with problems and disagreements. Husting's sole shareholder and president, Leon 
Harward (Harward), provided uncontroverted testimony that Construct Tech's work was 
incomplete, substandard and defective. Ultimately, in November of 1996, Hustings terminated 
its contract with Construct Tech. 
As a result of difficulties encountered with Construct Tech, the Galena Hills project was 
seriously behind schedule and Husting was unable to meet payment obligations on its 
construction financing. On January 14, 1997, Husting, as debtor-in-possession, filed its 
voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11. At the time of its Chapter 11 filing, Husting's 
intention for reorganization was to complete necessary subdivision improvements to Galena Hills 
and then sell the improved lots to pay secured and unsecured creditors. 
In February 1997, Harward and Rick McKell (McKell), President of RAM, visited the 
Galena Hills site to assess the work necessary to correct defects in the excavation and 
construction work and complete the project. At the site, McKell observed open trenches, 
pipelines that were not backfilled, lidless manholes and a number of other deficiencies. After 
further discussion between the parties, Harward invited RAM to bid on the project. RAM's bid 
proposal, for work on sewer, water, storm drain, irrigation and site work, totaled $258,191.40. In 
April 1997, Husting and RAM entered into a post-petition agreement (Construction Agreement), 
whereby RAM agreed to correct the defective work performed pre-petition by Construct Tech 
and to complete the remaining work on Phase II of the Galena Hills and Parkway Estates projects 
on a time and materials basis. The Construction Agreement provides as follows: 
. A. . 
2. Contract Sum: The owner shall pay the Contractor in current funds for the 
Contractor's performance of the Contract, subject to additions and deductions as 
provided for herein, as follows: 
A. During the process of correcting the other contractor's work to meet City 
and Sewer District requirements, R.A. McKell Excavation will invoice on 
a time and materials basis. Once deficiencies have been corrected 
progress can then proceed at agreed to umt price basis. 
3. Progress Payments: 
B. Based upon application for payment submitted to the Owner by the 
Contractor, the Owner shall make progress payments on account of the 
Contract Sum to the Contractor as provided herein. The period for 
payment shall be bi-weekly or as determined by the contractor but at no 
time will the billing period be less than bi-weekly. Owner agrees to make 
prompt application for payment from the escrow accounts presently 
established for the purpose of providing funds to pay the Contract Sum... 
RAM Exhibit 11, Construction Agreement at ffl 2 and 3. 
Prior to entering into the Construction Agreement, RAM was aware that Husting had 
filed for relief under Chapter 11 and understood that the only present sources of payment for its 
work was the approximate $612,000 in the Escrow Accounts established pursuant to the bonds 
with Draper City and the Salt Lake County Sewer District. However, Harward also led McKell 
to believe that other sources of payment existed, included the Adjoining Subdivisions 
Agreement, and funds from Castle Homes, L.L.C., a third-party investor that purportedly 
intended to purchase and build homes on the lots once the underground and surface 
improvements had been completed by RAM,2 and to otherwise invest in Husting in some 
Harward's representations to McKell regarding Castle Homes1 investment in the Galena Hills 
project was presumably based on the fact that Castle Homes had tendered earnest money to Hustmg for the purchase 
(continued .) 
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fashion.3 Husting did not obtain Court approval for incurring post-petilion unsecured debt under 
the terms of the Construction Agreement 
Shortly after RAM began working on the Galena Hills and Parkway Estates projects, it 
became apparent that neither McKell nor Husting had realized the scope of corrective work that 
would have to be done. Indeed, rather than simply correcting Construct Tech's deficiencies, 
most of the culinary and sanitary water lines and systems previously installed had to be 
completely removed and replaced. As a result, the invoices RAM submitted to Husting over the 
next several months on a time and materials basis exceeded his original bid proposal and the 
amounts held in the Escrow Accounts. Finally, in November of 1997, RAM ceased performing 
under the Construction Agreement because Husting and/or third parties had failed to pay past-
due invoices and because further payment or funding from the Escrow Accounts, the Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement and third-party investors appeared unlikely to materialize in the near 
future. In the seven months between May and November of 1997, RAM invoiced $969,633.08 
to Husting for materials and labor supplied for performing corrective work and making 
improvements to the Galena Hills and Parkway Estates projects. During the same period, 
2(...continued) 
of 36 lots See RAM Exhibit 42. By letter dated January 29, 1997, Michael D. Alvey of Castle Homes informed 
Husting of its "intent to honor purchase and lot take down agreement as represented by our earnest money." See 
RAM Exhibit 27 
3
 Amendments to Hustmg's Statement of Affairs indicate that effective June 17, 1997, Harward's 
equity interest in Husting was purchased by Castle Homes and Pro Built Co., and that Michael D Alvey had 
become Hunting's president No other evidence was presented that clarified how Castle Homes was to infuse funds 
into Husting, and no § 364 motion related to Castle Homes was filed 
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Husting paid RAM $371,640.57 with funds obtained through partial release of funds in the 
Escrow Accounts. 
In April 1998, three months after the Trustee was appointed in the Husting Chapter 11 
case upon Husting's own motion, RAM filed a Motion for Allowance of Administrative Expense 
(Motion) in which it claimed $648,444.77 in principal and interest as of January 15,1998. The 
Trustee and various creditors objected to RAM's Motion. Hearing on the Motion was continued 
several times at RAM's request. In the interim, a plan of reorganization proposed by the Trustee 
was confirmed under which the Court retained jurisdiction to resolve the issues raised in the 
Motion. An evidentiary hearing on the Motion was held and, after the close of RAM's evidence, 
the Trustee moved for a judgment on partial findings pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052(c) on 
the grounds that RAM had not met its initial burden of proving it was entitled to allowance of an 
administrative claim under § 364(a), whereupon the Court took the matter under advisement. As 
of September 1, 2000, the date the evidentiary hearing began, RAM asserts that its administrative 
expense claim totaled $874,820.85 in principal and interest. 
ISSUE 
The parties agree that the primary issue is whether or not Husting's debt to RAM was 
incurred in the "ordinary course of business" under § 364(a), such that court approval was not 
required for the administrative claim to be allowed and paid under the confirmed plan. 
. .7. . 
DISCUSSION 
A. Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this contested matter 
under 28 U.S.C.§ 1334, Article XIV of the Plan of Reorganization Proposed by Trustee, and % 16 
of the Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization Proposed by Trustee. This is a core proceeding 
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), and the Court has authority to enter a final order. Venue is 
proper in the Central Division of the District of Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 1409. 
B. Burden of Proof 
The party claiming entitlement to administrative expense priority has the burden of proof. 
In re Amerex, 853 F.2d 1526, 1530 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Robinson, 225 B.R 228, 230 (Bankr. 
N.D. Okla. 1998). In order to fall within the ambit of § 503(b)(1), RAM must demonstrate that 
the post-petition unsecured credit extended to Husting was extended, and the debt was incurred, 
in the ordinary course of Husting's business. 
C Analysis of "Ordinary Course" under Section 364(a) 
The ability of a trustee or a debtor-in-possession to incur unsecured debt allowed as an 
administrative expense under § 503(b)(1) is governed by §§ 364(a) and (b) of the Code. Under 
§ 364(a), an unsecured debt incurred post-petition is allowable as an administrative expense only 
if incurred in the ordinary course of a debtor's business. Otherwise, § 364(b) requires court 
authorization after notice and a hearing in order for the debt to obtain treatment as an 
administrative expense. If the debt was not incurred in the ordinary course of business, or the 
court does not enter an order approving the post-petition debt incurred outside the ordinary 
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course of the debtor's business, then the creditor to whom the unsecured debt is owed must stand 
in line with all other prepetition unsecured creditors. See Martina v. First National Bank in 
Harvey (Matter of Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R, 414,423 (NJD.Ill.199S). 
While neither the Bankruptcy Code nor legislative history defines the phrase "ordinary 
course of business" as used in § 364(a), the language is presumably designed to give the debtor-
in-possession or trustee operating the debtor's business the freedom to obtain unsecured credit 
and incur unsecured debt in the routine and normal course of business without the requirement of 
obtaining court approval after notice and a hearing. Indeed, "if a debtor had to seek court 
approval to pay for every expense incurred during the normal course of its affairs, the debtor 
would be in court more than in business." Bagus v. Clark (In re Buyer's Club Markets, Inc.) 5 
F.3d 455, 458 (I Oth Cir. 1993). Thus, through a synthesis of case law, courts have developed a 
workable analytical framework for determining whether an activity is within the debtor's 
"ordinary course of business.1' Committee v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 
60 B.R. 612,616 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'don other grounds, 801 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
The resulting legal standard has evolved into two identifiable tests. In Armstrong World 
Industries v. James A. Phillips, Inc. (In re James A. Phillips, Inc.), 29 B.R. 391 (S.D.N.Y- 1983), 
the district court set forth what has become known as the "creditor expectation" test: 
The touchstone of 'ordinariness' is . . . the interested parties' reasonable expectations of 
what transactions the debtor in possession is likely to enter in the course of its business. 
So long as the transactions conducted are consistent with these expectations, creditors 
have no right to notice and hearing, because their objections are likely to relate to the 
bankrupt's chapter 11 status, not the particular transactions themselves. 
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Id. at 394. Accord In re Century Brass Prod,, 107 B.R. 8, 11-12 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989). The 
creditor expectation test "examines the debtor's transactions from the vantage point of a 
hypothetical creditor and inquires whether the transaction subjects a creditor to economic risks of 
a different nature from those he accepted when he decided to extend credit." Johns-Manville, 60 
B.R. at 616. An element of the creditor expectation test, reformulated as the vertical dimension 
test, is that a creditor would not expect the debtor to be engaged in transactions that, by their 
"size, nature, or both are not with the day-to-day operations of a business and are therefore 
extraordinary.1' Waterfront^ 56 B.R at 35 (reformulating the creditor expectation test as the 
vertical dimension test); see also Buyer's Club Markets, F,3d at 458 (when debtor undertakes 
policy that transcends day-to-day affairs to the potential detriment of creditors, creditors are 
entitled to prior notice and opportunity to be heard); Johns-Manvitte, 60 B.R. at 617; Northern 
Bank v. Metropolitan Cosmetic and Reconstructive Surgical Clinic, P.A. et al (In re 
Metropolitan Cosmetic and Reconstructive Surgical Clinic, P.AJ, 115 B.R. 185,188 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1990) ("A good case can be made for the proposition that ordinary course includes only 
those payments of ordinary day-to-day operating expenses that, while necessary, are relatively 
insignificant"). 
Under the "ordinary course" scenario described in the creditor expectation test, a creditor 
is well aware that the Code permits the debtor-in-possession to incur expenses in its normal 
business operations, and would therefore not expect to be given notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. If, on the other hand, the transaction is one that might be considered unusual, 
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controversial or questionable for the debtor to undertake during its Chapter 11 case, a creditor 
would expect to be notified and provided an opportunity to object. See In re Media Central, Inc., 
115 B.R. 119,124 (Bankr. E.D. Term. 1990). Moreover, u[e]ven if the debtor-in-possession 
believes its contemplated action would be beneficial to the estate, and even if it later turns out the 
transaction was beneficial to the estate, if [it] is not in the ordinary course of business, creditors 
still have the right to notice and hearing before the transaction is entered into/' Id. 
A second dimension of the "ordinary course of business" test is to compare the debtor's 
business with like businesses to determine whether the disputed transaction is ordinary for the 
particular type of business concerned. Under this approach, known as the "horizontal dimension 
test," the court must: 
[Cjompare this debtor's business to other businesses and based on the kind of business it 
is in , . . . decide whether a type of transaction is in the course of that debtor's business or 
in the course of some other business. Thus raising a crop would not be the ordinary 
course of business for a widget manufacturer because that is not a widget manufacturer's 
ordinary business. 
Johnston v. First Street Cos (In re Waterfront Cos.), 56 B.R. 31, 35 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) 
(rejecting the argument that anything, including an open-ended indemnity agreement which 
facilitated the debtor's real estate development business, would be in the ordinary course of 
business ); see also Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc), 
853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); Johns-Manville, 60 B.R. at 618. 
Many courts have applied both tests. See e.g. Media Central, 115 B.R. at 124; Dant & 
Russell, 853 F.2d at 704 (describing and applying both the horizontal and vertical dimension 
analysis); Johns-Manville, 60 B.R. at 616-18 (same). However, the horizontal dimension test 
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has been criticized on statutory construction grounds as applicable only to the objective standard 
in the ordinary course of business defense to preference liability under § 547(c)(2)(C), as 
redundant of the creditor expectation test, and as difficult to apply. Garofalo, 186 B.R. at 428-
30; accord Rajala v. Longer (In re Lodge America), 239 B.R. 580, 585 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1999) 
(horizontal dimension test of ordinary course of business does not apply to § 364(a)). While 
Garofalo's criticism of the horizontal dimension test based upon the omission from § 364(a) of 
the "made according to ordinary business terms" language that is contained in § 547(c)(2)(C) 
may be challenged,4 its criticism based upon the redundant nature of the test and its difficulty of 
application is correct. A reasonable hypothetical creditor would not expect a debtor to incur debt 
inconsistent with the actions of similar businesses if, indeed similar businesses can be defined. 
This Court concludes, therefore, that the appropriate legal standard to apply in determining 
whether H listing's debt owed to RAM was incurred in the ordinary course of business is the 
creditor expectation/vertical dimension test. 
Garofalo 's statutory construction criticism of the horizontal dimension test is based on the fact 
that an "ordinary course" defense to preference liability requires that a transfer be "made according to ordinary 
business terms." § 547(c)(2)(C). This language requires an "objective standard to be shown by the custom in the 
industry in which the transferee and the debtor are engaged." Garofalo, 186 B.R. at 429. The court in Garofalo 
reasons that the horizontal dimension test is essentially the same as the "objective" standard in § 547(c)(2)(C) and, if 
Congress had wanted this standard applied to § 364(a), it "could have required that post-petition credit be obtained 
within the ordinary course of business terms; however, it chose not to do so." Id. 
The difficulty with this analysis is that to constitute an "ordinary course" defense under 
§ 547(c)(2), all three prongs of the § 547(c)(2) test must be met for a transfer to be deemed to fall within the 
meaning of "ordinary course of business." Garofalo s exclusion of a test that reflects "ordinary business terms'1 
from the meaning of "ordinary course of business" in § 364(a) is no more correct that concluding that ordinary 
course in § 364(a) means only the subjective test of the transactions between the "debtor and transferee." 
§547(c)(2)(B). 
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D. Application of the "Ordinary Course" Test to the Facts of this Case 
RAM argues that, as a real estate development company, it was ordinary for Husting to 
incur debt to construct the infrastructure at Galena Hills because all developers must construct 
storm drains, sewer, curb and gutter, sidewalk and street improvements. The work performed by 
RAM was of the same nature and scope as any contractor would perform on a similarly-sized 
project and, RAM argues, the Construction Agreement, invoices, fees charged and services 
performed are similar to other such projects. Further, RAM produced evidence that all the work 
for which RAM billed Husting was ultimately approved by the appropriate municipal authorities. 
Thus, according to RAM, the debt incurred by Husting on account of work done by RAM falls 
squarely within the ordinary course of business. The Court disagrees. 
The evidence is uncoutroverted that real estate developers install infrastructure such as 
that constructed by RAM on projects similar to Galena Hills, and that RAM's work was of 
sufficient quality to gain municipal approval. Also uncontroverted is the evidence that it was 
necessary to repair, or remove and replace, significant portions of Construct Tech's work. 
However, RAM attempted to prove its entitlement to administrative expense status by 
qualifying a real estate developer, Terry Diehl (Diehl), as an expert witness to opine that the debt 
owed to RAM was incurred by Husting in the ordinary course of its business. Diehl qualified as 
an expert pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 through his substantial real estate development 
experience. The Court, however, in keeping with its gatekeeping responsibility, concludes that 
. A3, 
RAM failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 
171 (1987), that Diehl's opinion regarding whether RAM's claim was incurred in the ordinary 
course of business was admissible because his methodology could not be proved under the test 
set forth in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (ruling that the 
factors outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) apply not 
only to scientific testimony, but to all expert testimony).5 The objective of the Daubert 
gatekeeping requirement is to "ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to 
make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field." Id. at 152. See also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm 
Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) (reviewing application of some of 
the factors listed in Daubert to a determination of market value). The Daubert reliability factors 
include, but are not limited to, whether a theory can or has been tested, whether it has been 
subjected to peer review, whether there are any known error rates, whether any standards or 
controls exist, and whether there is general acceptance of the theory in the scientific community. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.6 Some of these non-exclusive factors may be inapplicable to non-
5
 An opinion from an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same degree of scrutiny for 
reliability as an opinion from an expert who purports to be a scientist. See Watkins v, Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 
991 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[I]t seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to rely on general engineering 
principles and practical experience might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that their 
conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique."). 
6
 Recent amendments to Fe&R~Evid. 702 add the following language to the rule: 
(continued...) 
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scientific testimony, or an expert witness relying solely or primarily on experience. However, 
under these circumstances, "the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion 
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is 
reliably applied to the facts." Advisory Committee Notes, Amendments to Fed. R. Evid.702 
(effective December 1,2000). The expert's testimony should also be grounded in an accepted 
body of learning or experience in the expert's field. See, e.g., American College of Trial 
Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Testimony after 
Daubert 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994)("[W] hether the testimony concerns economic principles, 
accounting standards, property valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated 
by reference to the 'knowledge and experience' of that particular field/'). 
Diehl, as a professional and competent real estate developer, is certainly capable of 
making experience-based observations about his industry in non-opinion form, and the Court 
allowed his testimony describing the practices in the real estate development business. Smith v, 
Ingersoll'Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, (10th Cir. 2000) (allowing that portion of expert's testimony 
that defined damages, but excluding quantification testimony because it did not meet reliability 
%.. continued) 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (I) 
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
Amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 702 (effective December 1, 2000)(emphasis added). 
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test). However, under Daubert and Kuhmo, he cannot qualify as an expert competent to testify 
about what constitutes the "ordinary course of business" for the purpose of evaluating an 
administrative claim in a Chapter 11 case. No evidence was presented that Diehl had any 
familiarity with either the creditor expectation/vertical dimension test or the horizontal 
dimension test courts employ to determine ordinary course, and therefore his opinion testimony 
was not focused on facts that would tend to prove whether either test was met. Moreover, even if 
his methodology had been reliable and his opinion regarding whether RAM's debt was incurred 
in the ordinary course of business had been admitted, it would have spoken only to the horizontal 
dimension test for ordinary course of business, which the Court declines to employ for the 
reasons set forth above.7 
Consideration of the remainder of the admissible evidence leads to a conclusion that 
under the creditor expectation or vertical dimension test, there are a number of circumstances in 
this case that would place the Husting/RAM transactions outside the ordinary course of business. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Diehl had focused his attention on the correct set of facts, his 
description of his methodology supports a conclusion that it was unreliable. Diehl testified that he arrived at his 
conclusion regarding whether RAM's debt was incurred in the ordinary course of Husting's business using the 
following methodology- He reviewed RAM's invoices and compared the unit costs in relation to what Diehl 
customarily paid for similar goods and services, and he also compared the quantities used, finding they did not 
exceed the quantities customary for similar projects in the industry. Diehl reviewed RAM's bid proposal and 
analyzed the Construction Agreement and found both similar to cost basis contracts he had seen previously, 
although he indicated that a cost basis contract was unusual as was a bi-monthly billing period No evidence was 
presented that Diehl, or anyone else, had ever used such methodology before at amving at an ordinary course 
determination, or that this method could or had been tested by anyone else, or that it enjoyed widespread 
acceptance It was apparent that the methodology was developed solely for the purpose of this trial. Daubert v 
MeirellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc , 43 F.3d 1311,1317 (9th Cir 1995) (one factor is whether a expert is testifying 
about matteis growing naturally from research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether it has 
been developed expressly for the purposes of testifying) At best, DiehPs methodology was a subjective 
comparison of the Contract Agreement, invoices and fees charged in Husting with similar contracts and fees 
charged to his own company 
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First, although the unsecured debt incurred by Husting is ordinary in the sense that developers 
almost always have to incur construction debt, the transaction in this case, in which nearly one 
million dollars of debt was incurred, represents a major event in the development process for 
Husting and is the single most significant transaction to have taken place in the case during the 
time that Husting was a debtor in possession. Moreover, entering into an all-encompassing 
development contract is something that should only happen once in the development process - it 
is neither routine nor ordinary in the sense of normal day-to-day operations. See Waterfront, 56 
BR. at 35 ("Some transactions, either by their size, nature or both, are not within the day-to-day 
operations of a business and are therefore extraordinary."). 
Second, even if the magnitude and significance of RAM's transaction with Husting did 
not, by itself, take the transaction outside the "ordinary course," the fact that RAM was not hired 
solely to develop Husting's property, but also to correct defective work done by another 
contractor, compels such a conclusion. At best, it is ordinary and foreseeable to creditors that a 
developer will contract once to improve raw ground. However, it is neither ordinary nor 
foreseeable that a developer will contract twice for development and be required to pay the 
second contractor to tear out and correct the defective work of the first before adding value to the 
project. 
Third, the debt incurred on account of work done by RAM fails to qualify as "ordinary 
course" because a substantial part of RAM's work was perfomied on property owned by Holmes 
Mesa to satisfy Husting's obligations under the pre-petition Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement. 
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The Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement was entered into in 1996, and when Husting filed 
bankruptcy on January 14, 1997, the contract may have been executory (in that the development 
work had not been completed and what work had been performed by Construct Tech was 
defective) or it may have been breached and terminated for lack of performance. A reasonable 
hypothetical creditor would not expect that a real estate developer would enter into a construction 
contract without resolution of the legal obligations in the underlying contract. The "ordinary 
course** exception to obtaining court authority does not vitiate the requirement for court-approval 
of the assumption of executory contracts, nor does it allow the debtor-in-possession in incur post-
petition debt to resolve or satisfy a pre-petition obligation. See generally Cohen v. K.G* 
Financial Serve., Inc., (In re Miller Mining, Inc.), 219 BR. 219, 223 (Bank. ND. Ohio 1998) 
(opining that hypothetical creditor would expect to get notice before a pre-petition claim of 
$17,753.67 was paid; therefore, the transaction failed to meet "reasonable expectation5* test and 
could not be within the "ordinary course"). 
Fourth, at the time Husting and McKell entered into the Construction Agreement, neither 
had a clear understanding of what corrective work needed to be done. The Construction 
Agreement was a time and materials contract and, upon RAM's cessation of work, the costs had 
substantially exceeded RAM's original bid. An open-ended contract for an unknown amount of 
work is not a transaction that creditors would ordinarily expect to be entered into by a developer. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is not ordinary for a real estate developer to 
enter into a contract without a source to pay the amount incurred. In effect, the Construction 
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Agreement was an open-ended arrangement between Husting and RAM in which the parties 
agreed that RAM would do whatever was necessary to correct deficiencies and complete the 
project, and Husting would, if necessary, pay RAM's invoices from speculative non-debtor 
sources if funds in the Escrow Accounts were exhausted. The Adjoining Subdivisions 
Agreement was not a viable source of funding because, by its terms, reimbursement would not 
occur for up to twenty-four months after final inspection and approval of construction by various 
municipalities, and then only if certain other conditions were met. The funding from Castle 
Homes was undefined, but apparently consisted of Castle Homes, as Husting's equity interest 
holder, purchasing lots from its related entity, the debtor. Castle Homes was also to contribute 
funds, in some other undisclosed manner, to pay RAM's claim. Reasonable creditors would not 
expect that a developer would incur close to one million dollars in debt without a more certain 
source of funds to repay that debt. As such, the transaction was extraordinary in both scope and 
nature. It is precisely the type of arrangement of which creditors would expect to be given notice 
to afford them an opportunity to object. 
Because this case was submitted for a judgment on partial findings, the Court would be 
remiss if it did not consider whether there was an equitable reason why RAM's administrative 
claim should be allowed. No one in this case doubts that RAM performed professional and high 
quality work under the Construction Agreement. However, approval of RAM's claim in spite of 
the above ruling would be tantamount to retroactive notice and approval, which cannot be given 
unless the Court is confidant that the debt would have been authorized if a timely application had 
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been made. In re American Cooler Co., 125 F.2d 496, 497 (2nd Cir.1942); In reMassetti, 95 
B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D.Penn, 1989), For the reasons set forth above, it is highly unlikely that 
approval for Husting to incur the debt to RAM would have been given under the terms and 
conditions of the Construction Agreement. Nor has RAM been able to provide any reasons why 
approval was not sought in the first instance, given its knowledge that Husting was in a Chapter 
11 proceeding at the time the contract was executed. See In re Land, 943 F.2d 1265,1265 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (reflecting that nunc pro tunc approval is only appropriate in the most extraordinary 
circumstances, and is not justified by simple neglect). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby finds that RAM has failed to carry its burden 
of proving that the debt incurred by Husting in favor of RAM was within the ordinary course of 
Husting1 s business as contemplated under § 364(a). Therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Trustee's motion for judgment on partial findings is granted and 
RAM's Motion for Allowance of Administrative Expense is denied. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2000. 
. .20. . 
oooOooo 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and 
Order to the following, postage prepaid, by United States mail on the 22nd day of November, 2000. 
Steven F. Allred 
Steven F. Allred. P.C. 
584 South State Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
and 
Duane H, Giilman 
McDowell & Giilman, P.C. 
Twelfth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for R. A. McKell Excavating, Inc. 
R. Kimball Mosier 
Parsons Davies Kinghorn & Peters 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for the Chapter 11 Trustee 
F. Wayne Elggren 
Neilson, Elggren, Durkin & Co. 
77 West 200 South, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Chapter 11 Trustee 
George W. Pratt, and Adam S. Affleck 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Attorneys for the Webb Family Trust 
Daniel E. Garrison 
. .27. . 
Michael R. Johnson 
Snell & Wilmer 
1 i 1 East Broadway, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Construct Tech, Inc 
Peter Kuhn 
Boston Bldg. Suite 100 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for the United States Trustee 
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CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT 
THIS CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT entered into this 3m day of 
Ar<l , 1997, by and between HUSTING LAND & 
DEVELOPMENT, 12004 South Bear Hills Drive, Draper, Utah ("Owner") and R.A. 
McKELL EXCAVATION, 947 East 80 North, P.O. Box 312, Orem, Utah 84059 
("Contractor") is made with reference to the following facts: 
1. Owner is the owner and developer of a residential subdivision known as 
Galena Hills Subdivision located in Draper City, Utah (the"Project"). 
2. Owner has previously contracted with Constructed! for the construction of 
subdivision and utility improvements for the Project. Owner has 
terminated its contract with Constructech. 
3. Owner and Contractor desire to enter into an agreement under the terms of 
which the subdivision and utility improvement for the Project can be 
completed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual promises 
and covenants set forth herein, the parties agree as follows: 
4. The Work: The Contractor shall execute the entire Work described in the 
Contract Documents, except to the extent specifically indicated in the 
Contract Documents to be the responsibility of other, or as follows: 
The term "Work" means the construction and services required by the Contract 
Documents, whether completed or partially completed, and includes all other labor, 
materials, equipment and services provided or to be provided by the Contractor to 
fulfill the Contractor's obligations hereunder. 
l-l 
2. Contract Sum: The Owner shall pay the Contractor in current funds for the 
Contractor's performance of the Contract, subject to additions and deductions as 
provided for herein, as follows: 
A. During the process of correcting other contractor's work to meet 
City and Sewer District requirements, R. A. McKell Excavation will 
invoice on a time and materials basis. Once deficiencies have been 
corrected progress can then proceed at agreed to unit price basis. 
3. Progress Payments: 
B. Based upon applications for payment submitted to the Owner by 
the Contractor, the Owner shall make progress payments on account 
of the Contract Sum to the Contractor as provided herein. The 
period covered by each application for payment shall be bi-weekly 
or as determined by the contractor but at no time will the billing 
period be less than bi-weekly. Owner agrees to make prompt 
application for payment from the escrow accounts presently 
established for the purpose of providing funds to pay the Contract 
Sum. These escrow accounts are held by West One Bank. All 
checks issued by the bank shall be two party ie: R.A. McKell 
Excavation/Husting Land & Development. 
C. Payments due and unpaid under this Agreement shall bear 
interest from the date of payment at the rate of 14 per cent per 
annum until paid in full. 
1. Final Payment: Final payment, constituting the entire unpaid balance of 
the Contract Sum, shall be made by the Owner to the Contractor when the 
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Work has been substantially completed. All checks issued by the bank 
shall be two party ie: R.A. McKell Excavation/Husting Land & 
Development. 
5. Contract Documents: The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement, 
drawings, specifications, addenda issued prior to the execution of this Agreement, 
other documents set forth below and modifications issued after execution of this 
Agreement. The intent of the Contract Documents is to include ail items 
necessary for the proper execution and completion of the Work by the Contractor. 
The Contract Documents are complimentary, and what is required by one shall be 
as binding as if required by all; performance of the Contractor shall be required 
only to the extent consistent with the Contract Documents. Additional Contract 
Documents are: 
6. Permits and Surveys: The Owner shall furnish surveys and a legal description of 
the site of the Project. The Owner shall secure and pay for the necessary 
approvals, easements, permits, assessments and charges required for the 
construction, use or occupancy of the Project. 
7. Contractor's Obligations: 
D. The Contractor shall supervise and direct the Work, using the 
Contractor's best skills and attention. The Contractor shall be 
solely responsible for and have control over construction means, 
methods, techniques, sequences and procedures and for 
coordinating all portions of the Work. 
E. Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents, the 
Contractor shall provide and pay for labor, materials, equipment, 
tools, construction equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilities, 
transportation, and other facilities and services necessary for the 
proper execution and completion of the Work, whether temporary 
or permanent and whether or not incorporated or to be incorporated 
in the Work. 
F. Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents, the 
Contractor shall pay sales, use or other similar taxes which are 
legally enacted and applicable to the Work. 
G. The Contractor shall review, approve and submit to the Owner 
or the Owner's representative, shop drawings, product data, samples 
and similar submittals required by the Contract Documents with 
reasonable promptness The Work shall be in accordance with 
approved submittals. 
8. Changes in the Work: The Owner may order changes in the Work consisting of 
additions, deletions or modifications, the Contract Sum and Contract Time being 
adjusted accordingly. The cost or credit to the Owner from a change in the Work 
shall be determined by mutual agreement. The Contractor shall not be required 
to undertake the change in the Work unless and until a written change order 
agreement is executed by both parties. 
9. Time: If the Contractor is delayed at any time in progress of the Work by changes 
ordered in the Work, by labor disputes, unusual delay in deliveries, abnormal 
adverse weather conditions not reasonably anticipated, imavoidable casualties or 
any causes beyond the Contractor's control, then the Contract Time shall be 
extended by change order for such reasonable time as the parties may determine. 
10. Insurance: 
H. The Contractor shall purchase from and maintain in a company 
or companies lawfully authorized to do business in the State of 
Utah, insurance for protection from claims under workers' or 
workman's compensation acts or other employee benefit acts which 
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are applicable, claims for damages because of bodily injury, 
including death, and from claims for damages, other than to the 
Work itself, to property which may arise out of or result from the 
Contractor's operations under this Agreement. 
I. The Owner shall be responsible for purchasing and maintaining the 
Owner's usual liability insurance. Optionally, the Owner may 
purchase and maintain other insurance for self protection against 
claims which may arise from operations under the Contract. The 
Owner shall purchase and maintain, in a company or companies 
lawfully authorized to do business in the State of Utah, property 
insurance upon the entire Work at the site to the full insurable value 
thereof. This insurance shall be on an all-risk policy form and shall 
include interests of the Owner, the Contractor and any 
subcontractors and shall insure against perils of fire and extended 
coverage and physical loss or damage including, without 
duplication of coverage, theft, vandalism and malicious mischief 
Correction of Work: The Contractor shall promptly correct Work failing to 
conform to the requirements of the Contract Documents and shall correct any 
Work found to be not in accordance with the requirements of the Contract 
Documents within a period of one year from the date of Substantial Completion. 
This warranty shall not extend to any of the Work that is already in place on the 
Property as of the date of the execution of this Agreement. 
Termination of Contract: If the Owner fails to make payment upon an 
Application for Payment submitted in accordance with the Agreement for a period 
of 30 days from the date of submission of the Application for Payment, the 
Contractor may, upon 3 days additional written notice to the Owner, terminate this 
Agreement and recover from the Owner payment for the Work executed and for 
proven losses with respect to materials, equipment, tools, and construction 
equipment and machinery, including reasonable overhead, profit and damages 
applicable to the Project. 
13. Miscellaneous Provisions: 
J. In the event of default, the defaulting party agrees to pay all costs 
of enforcing this Agreement, or any right arising out of a breach 
thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
K. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused their duly authorized agents 
to execute this Agreement the date first above written. 
OWNER: 
HUSTING LAND & DEVELOPMENT 
R.A. McKELL EXCAVATING, INC. 
Its: - ^ S - y-3-91 
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Sheetl 
EQUIPMENT RATES - GALENA HILLS 
EQUIPMENT 
220 TRACKHOE 
200 TRACKHOE 
150TRACKHOE 
953 LOADER 
544 LOADER 
L90 LOADER 
D65 DOZER 
D5 DOZER 
140H GRADER 
SCRAPER 
C142 COMPACTOR 
WATER TRUCK 
SUPERVISOR 
PIPE LAYER 
LABORER 
AMOUNT 
$125.00 
$110.00 
$85.00 
$110.00 
$95.00 
$125.00 
$140.00 
$125.00 
$100.00 
$140.00 
$60.00 
$65.00 
$35.00 
$25.00 
$22.00 
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Douglas J. Payne, A4113 
P. Bruce Badger, A4791 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
a Utah Corporation, and COULTER & ) AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID GEORGE 
SMITH, LTD., a Nevada Corporation, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
R.A. MCKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a ) Case No. 000909210 
Utah Corporation, RICK MCKELL, an ) 
individual, ) Judge William J. Bohling 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
David George, having been duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I state the following facts upon my own knowledge and if called upon to testify 
would be competent to do so. 
UP 
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2. In late 1992 or early 1993 I began my employment with Holmes & Roberts, Inc., 
as the office manager of the company. Holmes & Roberts, Inc., contracts with, among others, 
John Holmes Construction, Inc. ("Holmes"') to provide all necessary supervisory functions in the 
development of residential property, including the construction and sale of homes. 
3. I am personally familiar with the property that the Plaintiffs refer to in the above-
entitled lawsuit as the "Holmes Property" located at approximately 600 West and 12300 South, 
Draper, Utah, and the "Roadway" which is a dedicated street that Holmes and Mesa 
Development, Inc. ("Mesa") deeded to Draper City so that Husting Land & Development 
("Husting") would have access to its adjoining property. 
4. I am also personally familiar with the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement, dated on 
or about March 8, 1996, between Holmes. Mesa and Husting, in which Husting agreed to arrange 
for construction of the Roadway, including the placement of sewer and water lines under the 
dedicated street. 
5. At no time did Holmes authorize the work that R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. 
("McKell") performed under its April 3, 1997 Construction Agreement with Husting as the 
Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement required. 
6. At no time did Holmes or anyone with authority to act on its behalf authorize or 
approve McKell as a contractor as the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement required. 
7. Although I visited the Holmes Property during the period November 1997 to 
September 1999,1 did not observe that McKell had performed any construction work of any kind 
on either the Roadway or the Holmes Property during this period. 
246372-1 2 X 
8. Holmes did not hire McKell, it did not approve McKell to do work on the Holmes 
Property, it did not offer or agree to pay McKell, and it did not request any construction services 
whatsoever from McKell. 
9. During the time McKell claims in its Notice of Claim of Lien to have initiated its 
work and the time that McKell filed its Notice of Claim of Lien, McKell never made any request 
for payment to Holmes. 
10. On or about August 1,2000, Holmes and Coulter sold the Holmes Property to 
Draper City as undeveloped land. 
11. The sale of the Holmes Property contained several conditions in light of McKell's 
lien and required Homes and Coulter to set aside a portion of the sales proceeds to be held in 
escrow until McKell's lien is removed from the Holmes Property. The sale also provided that as 
between Draper City and Holmes and Coulter, Holmes and Coulter would bear financial 
responsibility for McKell's lien. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this Ik day of P\ < y 2002. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j, 1/Tday of hAMf~ , 2002. 
Notary Public 
UANNETT6ARNELL 
WWPUBLIC'SMcfm 
1635W0APPELGRAYCIR. 
QIVERTON.UT 84065 
COMM EXP 2-5-2005 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the Jlfflj- day of JY\/I.U , 2002,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID GEORGE by depositing said 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Jack W. Reed 
Jerald V. Hale 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
246372-1 
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Douglas J. Payne, A4113 
P. Bruce Badger, A4791 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
^
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, and COULTER & 
SMITH, LTD., a Nevada Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R.A. MCKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, RICK MCKELL, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN COULTER 
Case No. 000909210 
Judge William J. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Nathan Coulter, having been duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I state the following facts upon my own knowledge and if called upon to testify 
would be competent to do so. 
246376-1 
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2. I am the president of Coulter & Smith, Ltd., a Nevada corporation ("Coulter and 
Smith")- I am also the president of Mesa Development, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Mesa"). 
3. I am personally familiar with the property that the Plaintiffs refer to in the above-
entitled lawsuit as the "Holmes Property" located at approximately 600 West and 12300 South, 
Draper, Utah, and the "Roadway" which is a dedicated street that John Holmes Construction, 
Inc. and Mesa deeded to Draper City so that Husting Land & Development ("Husting") would 
have access to its adjoining property. 
4. Coulter and Smith is the successor-in-interest to Mesa with respect to its 
ownership of the Holmes Property. 
5. I am also personally familiar with the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement, dated on 
or about March 871996, between Holmes, Mesa and Husting, in which Husting agreed to arrange 
for construction of the Roadway, including the placement of sewer and water lines under the 
dedicated street. 
6. At no time did Mesa or Coulter and Smith authorize the work that R.A. McKell 
Excavating, Inc. ("McKell") performed under its April 3,1997 Construction Agreement with 
Husting as the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement required. 
7. At no time did Mesa or Coulter and Smith authorize or approve McKell as a 
contractor as the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement required. 
8. Although I visited the Holmes Property during the period November 1997 to 
September 1999,1 have no knowledge that McKell performed any construction work of any kind 
on either the Roadway or the Holmes Property during this period. 
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9. Mesa and Coulter and Smith did not hire McKell to do work on the Holmes 
Property, they did not approve McKell to do work on the Holmes Property, they did not offer or 
agree to pay McKell and they did not request any construction services whatsoever from McKell 
10, During the time McKell claims in its Notice of Claim of Lien to have initiated its 
work and the time that McKell filed its Notice of Claim of Lien, McKell never made any request 
for payment to Mesa or Coulter and Smith, 
U. On or about August 1,2000, Holmes and Coulter and Smith sold the Holmes 
Property to Draper City as undeveloped land. 
12. The sale of the Holmes Property contained several conditions in light of McKell'$ 
lien and required Holmes and Coulter and Smith to set aside a portion of the sales proceeds to be 
held in escrow until McKell's lien is removed from the Holmes Property. The sale also provided 
that as between Draper City and Holmes and Coulter and Smith, Holmes and Coulter and Smith 
would bear financial responsibility for McKell's lien. 
Further affiant sayeth not, 
DATED this day of Apt I ,2002. 
m Coulter Nathan lt  
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3 ^ day of $ f r i « 2002. 
Notary Public 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the JjC £-"- day of May, 2002,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and 
con-ect copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN COULTER by depositing said 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Jack W. Reed 
Jerald V. Hale 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Steven F. Allred (Bar No. 5437) 
LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN F. ALLRED, P.C. 
Attorney for R.A. McKell Excavating 
584 South State Street 
Orem, UT 84058 
Telephone:(801) 431-0718 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re ] 
HUSTING LAND & DEVELOPMENT, ] 
INC. , 
Debtor. 
1 Bankruptcy No. 97B-20309 
Chapter 11 
) AFFIDAVIT OF R.A. MCKELL 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
RICK A. MCKELL, being first duly sworn upon his oath states 
and deposes as follows: 
1. I am of age and am competent to testify in a court of 
law if necessary. 
2. I am and have been the President, principal, and 
majority shareholder in R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc., 
(hereinafter "McKell") a Utah corporation since its incorporation 
in January, 1994. 
3. McKell is a licensed general engineering contractor. 
4. As president of McKell, my duties and responsibilities 
1 
include oversight over all bidding and actual excavation work of 
the company, including billing, accounting and record keeping. 
5. About January, 1997, I was contacted by Leon Harward, 
(hereinafter "Harward") President of Husting Land and 
Development, Inc. (hereinafter "Husting"). Harward informed me 
that he was the owner/developer of a project known as Galena 
Hills located in Draper, Utah, (hereinafter "the Project") 
6. Harward discussed with me the fact that the Project was 
in Chapter 11, and that the filing had been precipitated in part 
by the incompetence and delay of Construct Tech, (hereinafter 
"Tech.") an excavation contractor hired by Harward on the 
Project. Harward solicited a bid from me to remediate Tech's 
defective work and a price to complete the Project. 
7. At Harward's invitation I met him at the Project to do 
a site inspection and to evaluate whether McKell wanted to be 
involved in the Project. 
8. I discussed contract terms with Harward who informed me 
that the Project's funding sources were bonds with the Salt Lake 
County Sewerage Improvement District, (hereinafter "Salt Lake 
County") Draper City (hereinafter "Draper") and funds to be 
provided by John Holmes Construction, Inc. ("Holmes") and Mesa 
Development, Inc. ("Mesa") 
9. I knew that Salt Lake County and Draper were bonded. I 
did not know that the parcel at the entrance of the Project 
2 
\ 
(hereinafter "the Parkway') was not bonded. However, Harward 
assured me that he had a binding written agreement with Holmes & 
Mesa to fund the improvements on the Parkway and that such funds 
were forthcoming from Holmes and Mesa. 
10. My estimator (Ernie Thornton) and I prepared a "Bid 
Proposal" (hereinafter "Proposal") for the Project and a cover 
letter (hereinafter "Cover Letter") highlighting my concerns with 
correcting Tech's defective work and the manner in which the 
other work would be prosecuted. I personally hand delivered 
the Proposal and Cover Letter to Harward on or about February 4, 
1997. Copies of the Proposal and Cover Letter are attached 
hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B." 
11. Harward accepted my Proposal at a meeting in my office 
and McKell tentatively agreed to commence work on April 11, 1997. 
12. McKell formally agreed to do the work on the Project 
by executing a Construction Agreement, (hereinafter "Agreement") 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D" to McKell's 
Application. 
13. McKell commenced work on the Project on April 11, 
1997. 
14. Pursuant to the Agreement, (Exhibit "D" to the 
Application) and a letter from Salt Lake County, (Exhibit "B" to 
the Application) McKell agreed to first remediate deficiencies 
in the sewer system before providing other services. 
3 
15- About July, 1997, I contacted Harward about payment of 
the balance owed McKell for services rendered on the Project. 
Harward informed me that he had contracted with Castle Homes to 
sell Husting's stock and that Castle Homes was taking over the 
Project and funds would be available to satisfy McKell's 
invoices. 
16. On or about October 2, 1997, I personally met with 
Mike Alvey and Jerry Huish(hereinafter "Alvey" and "Huish") of 
Castle Homes. My secretary, Kathy Christiansen accompanied me. 
At that meeting Holmes & Mesa represented to us that the Project 
was going to be bought out and that Castle Homes would assume 
liability for payment of McKell's invoices, copies of which were 
given to and reviewed with Alvey. 
17. McKell ceased work on the Project on November 4, 
1997. Exhibit "C" attached hereto is an amended statement of 
all services completed during the construction period as of 
January 15, 1999. 
18. Exhibit "C" is an amendment of Exhibit "A" attached to 
McKell's Application. (hereinafter "McKell's Original 
Statement") Invoice No. 118 97, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "D" hereto was inadvertently left off of the Original 
Statement attached to McKell's Application because it had been 
paid in full on July 18, 1997, Check No. 027406437. 
19• A statement of all amounts paid to and received by 
4 
McKell is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." According to Exhibit 
"E" hereto, McKell has been paid $371,388.83 
20. Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a copy of an amended 
statement showing principal, interest, check dates and numbers as 
of October 1, 1999. 
21. Exhibit "F" was prepared because McKell's Original 
Statement (Exhibit "A" to the Application") computed interest 
accrual at the rate of 17% as proposed by the Trustee when the 
Trustee and McKell negotiated a tentative agreement that McKell 
would complete the Project subject to bankruptcy court approval. 
22. As of October 1, 1999, McKell is owed the principal 
amount of $597,992.51 plus interest accrued at the contractual 
rate of 14% in the amount of $169,027.62 for a total claim of 
$767,020.13 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / of September, 
1999. 
/$&$&. DYANN M. PEARSON 
0 / ^ S r a W WWYPUBLIC-SUTEotUTW 
Is I <P**» )l) 953 S 0 U T H 250 WEST #C 
V * * * * * ? p B O V O . UT 84601 
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N o t a ] 'Public 
-"-I f.'.Cf CO!..':-, 
Jack W. Reed, Utah Bar No. 4651 
Jerald V. Hale, Utah Bar No. 8466 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. (801) 364-4040 
Facsimile No. (801) 364-4060 
Attorneys for R. A. McKell Excavating, Inc. and Rick McKell 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and COULTER 
& SMITH, LTD., a Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
R.A. MCKELL EXCAVATING, INC , a 
Utah corporation, RICK MCKELL, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
RICK MCKELL 
Civil No. 000909210 
Judge William J. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Rick McKell, being sworn state I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth 
in this Affidavit and if called as a witness in this matter I would and could competently 
testify as set forth in this Affidavit. 
Z\l> 
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1. I am the president of R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. 
2. On or about April 3, 1997, R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. entered into a 
Construction Agreement with Husting Land Development, who was operating as debtor 
in possession having filed a Chapter 11 Banki'uptcy case in January 1997. The agreement 
required McKell Excavating to repair the defective work of a prior contractor, Construct 
Tech, and then to install water, sewer, storm sewer, utilities, roads, and curb and gutter 
for the Galena Hills subdivision and Parkway Estates subdivision. Husting told me it 
had entered into an Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement with Homes Mesa which 
provided a mechanism for payment of work which McKell Excavating furnished to the 
Parkway Estates property. 
3. After starting the work, I met with Nathan Coulter at least twice. The 
purpose of the meeting was for Coulter to indicate the location of water and sewer 
laterals on Parkway Estates' lots accessed by Galen Park Boulevard, and to make sure 
McKell Excavating stubbed in sewer and water mains to future streets in Parkway 
Estates. Coulter also asked for a bid to complete a cul-de-sac off Galena Park Boulevard 
and to complete a subsequent phase of Parkway Estates. McKell Excavating installed the 
water and sewer lines off Galena Park Boulevard and installed the sewer and water mains 
for future streets in Parkway Estates. All of this work was inspected and accepted by the 
Salt Lake County Sewer Improvement District and Draper City. 
4. Ultimately, McKell Excavating was partially paid by the release of funds 
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from escrow accounts established pursuant to improvement bonds with Draper City and, 
the Salt Lake County Sewer District. McKell Excavating invoiced Husting a total of 
$969,633.08 for work perfomied between May and November 1997. After application of 
the escrow funds, a balance of $648,444.77 remained. The value of McKell Excavating's 
labor, material, and services furnished to the Parkway Estates property, and which 
remains unpaid, is $132,824.18. 
5. To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, Homes Mesa never 
reimbursed Husting for the improvements McKell Excavating furnished to the Parkway 
Estates property. 
6. Thereafter, McKell Excavating worked aggressively with the bankruptcy 
court appointed trustee, F. Wayne Elggren, to complete the improvements for the project 
including the work required to be done on the Parkway Estates property. By February 
1999, McKell Excavating had reached a tentative agreement with the Trustee, 
EaglePointe and Galena Hills under which the improvement would go forward and 
McKell would be paid. Unfortunately, some of Husting's creditors objected to the plan, 
and it was not approved by the bankruptcy court. 
7. By September 3, 1999, the bankruptcy court had entered it's Order 
Approving Post Petition Financing, in which EaglePointe on behalf of the trustee, agreed 
to complete phases, I, II, and III of the Galena Hills subdivision as well as additional 
improvements required under the Adjoining Subdivision's Agreement, including 
completing the improvements on the Parkway Estates property. 
3 
8. On September 20, 1999, McKell Excavating and EaglePointe entered into 
an contract in which McKell Excavating agreed to complete the improvements previously 
begun under the Construction Agreement with Husting. 
9. McKell Excavating completed work for Phases I, II, of Galena 
Hills, as well as the related improvements to the Parkway Estate's property. Individuals 
have purchased lots m Galena Hills, and construction of numerous homes is underway. 
10. By June, 2002, McKell Excavating received authorization from 
EaglePointe to begin working on Phase III of Galena Hills. Until this work is completed, 
the work originally anticipated to be completed under the agreement with Husting will 
not be finally completed. 
11. McKell Excavating's work performed on behalf of the trustee through 
EaglePointe is substantially the same as the work McKell Excavating agreed to perform 
under the Construction Agreement with Husting. 
DATED this S d ay of June, 2002. 
^ RickJlcKell (-~>y 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3 f day of June, 2002. 
4 Z 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Q day of June, 2002,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RICK MCKELL to be hand delivered 
to the following: 
Douglas J. Payne 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
5 
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VYHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
o 
JO 
C 
R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. 
Rick McKeli 
P.O. Box 312 
Orem, Utah 84059 
(801) 225-7662 
NOTICE OF CLAIM OF LIEN 
"Mechanic's Lien/Preliminary claim against Bond" 
7654861 
06/07/2000 W3? ft l ^ O O AS 
13W S 500 £ 
P0EQX6065 
SLC Iff B115H065 
BY.' RDJ, DEPUTY - HI 2 p . 
NOTICE (S HEREBY GIVEN by INTERMOUNTAIN C.N.S., LL.C, the undersigned acting 
as the duly authorized limited agent of R A McKELL EXCAVATING, INC., "Lien claimant". Said 
agent hereby gives notice of the intention of said claimant to hold and claim a mechanic's lien and 
right of claim against bond, by virtue and in accordance with the provisions of Sections 38-1-3 et 
seq., and 14-2-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. That said lien is against the 
property and improvements thereon owned or reputed to be owned by JOHN HOLMES 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., etal. Said improvements are located at approximately 12400 South 550 
West, Draper City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Legal Description Parcel #27-25-351-017,024, 27^25-376-002 
See Exhibit "A", being attached and made a part hereof. 
The lien claimant was employed by and did provide contracting services, labor, materials 
and equipment (street improvements and underground utilities) for the benefit and improvement 
of said real property at the request of HUSTINGS LAND AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., whose 
address is 12004 South Bear Hills Drive, Draper, Utah 84020. That first said services, labor or 
materials were provided on June 30,1997 and last provided on January 26,2000. That there is 
due and owing to said claimant the sum of One Hundred and Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred 
and Twenty-Four dollars and Eighteen cents ($132,824.18), together with interest, costs of 
$125,00 and attorney fees, if applicable; all for which the lien claimant holds and claims this lien. 
INTERMOUNTAIN C.N.S., LLC. 
Limited ag^&ior the lien claimant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: 8 S . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BY: 
nthony L. Scarborough 
On June 6,2000, personally appeared before me Anthony L Scarborough, manager of INTERMOUNTAIN 
C.N.S., L L C , the Company that executed the above and fbregofcig instrument as limited agent for the lien claimant, 
and mat said instrument was signed in behatf of said Company and that said Anthony L Scarborough acknowledged 
to me that said Company executed the same. IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have herein set my hand and affixed my seal, 
My Commission Expires: 
1 -...rtniij, 
I 
! 
Nrtfiry Public J 
KEUY CASSEJX . i 
Salt Loko City. Utah 84105 -
ft At* /S*»*tmlAff /Vk F V r l i n V t » 
'fykMtM. 
Public, residing la 
ake CWy, UT 
& $?K$> gf My Com te$kn Exptes J 
^ C v f ' August 9.2001 1 
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CO 
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CD 
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ro 
Oreter#a$-Q37-B 
INTERMOUNTAIN C,N,SM L L C , P.O, BOX 6065. S.LC. UT 84152-6066 
(801) 486-6672 
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Exhibit "A" 
Parkway Estates Phase 1 
550 West 12400 South 
Draper, Utah 
Legal Description Parcel #27-25-351 -017, 024 & 27-25-376-002 
PARCEL I _ o ( l | _ 
Beginning 1542 feet west feet Southeast Comer Southwest Quarter Section 25, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; West 262,6 feet; 
North 1°51* West 1576 feet; East 262.6 feet; South ld51« East 1576 feet to 
beginning except beginning North 89°49'Q8,t East 848.632 feet and North 1°59'58B 
West 1312.247 feet from Southwest Corner Section 25, TownsMp 3 Souua, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; North 89°50'32n East 184,133 feet; North 
4°32,39" West 125.563 feet; North l<s59f58" West 94.308 feet; North 47°54,2QK 
West 20.98 feet; North 89°59,201' West 163.496 feet; South 1°59T58" East 
234.163. feet to beginning less street 5.79 acres more or less. 
PARCELS —OlA 
Beginning West 1279.40 feet from Southeast corner of Southwest Quarter Section 
25, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; West 262.6 
feet; North 1°51' West 1245 feet; East 262.60 feet; South 1°51' East 1245,03 feet 
to beginning. 7.50 acres. 
PARCEL Iff 
Beginning North 89M9*08H East 1373.82 feet from Southwest corner section 25, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; North l°59,584r 
West 1245.71 feet; North 89°50,57" East 5.36 feet; Norfii l°52'02n West 138.9 
feet; South 89°59,20n East 191.72 feet; South l ^ s r a * East 1383.87 feet; South 
89°49W West 50.02 feet; South 1°51'23" East 390.21 feet; South 51021145" 
West 1443.42 feet; South20°02*25fl East 86.63 feet; South 51c33'35rt West 543.03 
feet; South 0n4'35w East 263.24 feet; North 20°10,52" West 35.19 feet; North 
0°14'35n West 235.9? feet; North51033'35" East 212.97 feet; North 19M51 West 
83.3$ feet; Northeasterly along a 50 foot radius curve to L 20.14 feet; South 
19°45' East 76,59 feet; Norfii 5l°33'35n East 306.12 feet; North 20°02,51tt West 
S6.6 feet; North 51°21 r45n East 1379.66 feet North Q°$V West 161.77 feet; North 
79°26'02" West 154.53 feet; Northerly along a 50 foot radius curve to L 12.03 J» 
feet; South 79°26,02D East 151,89 feet; North 0°51» West 251.78 feet; South <jj 
89°49'08* West 78.76 feet to beginning. 7.46 acres. 5£ 
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